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Abstract: The main aim of this essay is to define the concept of multilevel governance as a political 
model and to identify the effects that this concept has if it is implemented at the level of European Union. Firstly, 
I will talk about the concept of multilevel governance and what it means in practice. Secondly, I will analyze the 
multilevel governance concept in the context of European Union. Thirdly, I will show what this concept brings 
new to the public management, both at national and supranational level. 
 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AS A POLITICAL MODEL 
 
Governance is identified by the American scholars Hooghe and Marks (2003), as being 
the binding decision-making at the level of public sphere and analyzed in its various forms. 
There are new forms of governance and dispersion of decision-making that goes away from 
the central states and that gained the attention of numerous political sciences scholars. It is a 
period when centralized authority, command and control, has few advocates, but the modern 
way of governance gains more and more supporters.  
Multilevel governance is a model that is well described by the scholars of politics and 
public administration. Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government to the 
new process of governing. In fact, the scholars (Rhodes 2000,) identify more definitions of 
the concept of governance, as a tool for reforming public administration. The first - 
governance as corporate behavior, means more efficiency in this sector, by recommending 
openness, integrity and completeness and also accountability with the clear allocation of roles 
and individual accountability (CIPFA, 1994:6 in Szczerski, 2004). The second is governance 
as New Public Management means the use of corporate management and marketing at the 
level of public administration, at key levels. The third is governance as good governance and 
it was born at the World Bank level, and it tries to mix the previous idea with the idea of 
liberal democracy standards, meaning “efficient, open, accountable and audited public 
service” (World Bank 1992: 611). This aim should be achieved through reducing over-
staffing, introducing budgetary discipline, decentralization and more usage of non-
governmental organization. The fourth definition – governance as a socio-cybernetic system, 
shows the limits of the state-centric approach of governing, by introducing terms of 
interactive political administrative polycentric system, where government is no longer a single 
sovereign authority. The fifth definition – governance as New Political Economy shows the 
interrelations of the state with the economy and the role of the state as coordinator of 
economic activities.  
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The sixth and seventh meaning of governance are the most important for our analysis. 
One refers to governing through and with networks, employing shorthand. Rhodes describes 
these policy networks as organizations clustered around a major government or department. 
Networks have a distinct coordinating mechanism, that is separate from markets and 
hierarchies. It is based on shared values and norms and also on trust, that is essential for 
corporate behavior, and implicitly for the existence of network. In fact, governance leads to 
fragmentation of public activities, by building new networks, but also increases the 
membership of existing networks, incorporating both the private and voluntary sectors. The 
government changed direct for indirect control, but it can set its limits to network actions, 
trough funds, legal and operational frameworks. 
The last approach of governance is characterized by the meaning of international 
interdependence, putting into the centre of debate the questions of “hollowing out” and 
“multilevel governance”. The thesis of hollowing out (Held 1991, Pierre, Peters, 2000 in 
Szczerski, 2004) argues that the state authority is eroding trough internationalization of 
production and financial transactions, internationally regulated trade, international 
organizations, international binding law, hegemonic powers and power blocks. The challenge 
comes from transnational and self-government policy networks emerging the EU. In fact, 
there are three displacement of control and state power: upwards, towards international actors 
and organizations, downward, towards regions, cities and communities, and outward, to 
institutions operating under considerable discretion from the state (Pierre, Peters, 2000). 
There is an interesting debate between “consolidationists” and “fragmentationists” in the 
local American government. There is a general agreement between in the literature that 
decisions on a variety of services such as fire protection, policing, schooling, transport are 
better taken locally. The real problem is how is this authority over such services is organized. 
The problem is if the number of jurisdictions for each urban area should be limited, or 
reduced to a single unit, in order to produce economies in the local service delivery and also 
to focus political responsibility. Or, by the contrary, the urban area should have numerous 
overlapping special-purpose local jurisdictions to increase choice and flexibility (Keating 
1995, Lowery 2000, Ostrom 1972, in Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
The authors give an interesting example on this – the organization of public transit in the 
San Francisco Bay Area. They described the situation there in the1970s, when public rail and 
bus service was fragmented into seven overlapping jurisdictions. Four of these, the Alameda 
Contra Costa County Transit District, Santa Clara County Transit District, the San Mateo 
County Transit District and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District are special-purpose 
jurisdictions created by the California State legislation. The first three were activated by 
voters, and all except the San Mateo County Transit District have directly elected Boards of 
Directors. A fifth jurisdiction was incorporated under California legislation to operate the 
Golden Gate and its approaches, with a 19-member board appointed by six surrounding 
counties. The sixth, the Muni, is a division of the Public Utilities Commission of San 
Francisco. Finally, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission encompasses the entire Bay 
Area, and is also empowered by the state legislature to review budgets, coordinate long-term 
planning and vet applications for financial assistance. The example is considered a “success 
story”, with all its complex patterns of interdependence, formal institutions and informal 
networks that characterize the whole system. 
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MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Similar issue arise in the context of European integration. Centralized national authority 
in a European super-state is not on the agenda, but sharply different jurisdictional designs are 
an offer. Federalists support a coherent system of nested governments, stretching up to a 
unified European level. These national governments, and with them also nested the regional 
and local governments for the policies at lower territorial scales. There are specialists that 
does not agree that Europeans would be better served by the overlapping and even competing 
jurisdictions, in a “variable geometry” at the European level.  
The scholars in political science share a basic postulate, that the dispersion of 
governance across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible then the concentration of governance 
in one single jurisdiction (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Territorially extensive jurisdictions 
exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods, internalizing policy externalities, 
and because of this allowing a more efficient taxation, facilitating more efficient redistribution 
and not for last, enlarging the territorial scope of security and market exchange. The problem 
of large jurisdictions is when they impose a single policy on diverse populations with diverse 
ecological systems or that are territorially heterogeneous. In fact the problem is that 
centralized government is not very sensitive in varying scale efficiencies from a different 
policy to the other. In fact, efficiency requires that a policy’s full effects, both positive and 
negative should be internalized in the decision-making process. Under multilevel-governance, 
jurisdictions can be designed with this variation in mind. 
Developments at the European Union level over the last decades have shown us that the 
debate over the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority of 
member states in Europe. Over the years, the scope and depth of policy-making has 
dramatically increased. The EU is in the process of fully completing its reforms. It has 
completed the internal market and has absorbed the reforms proposed by the Single European 
Act (1986), The Maastricht Treaty to those proposed by the Nice Treaty. In fact, we should 
analyze the impact of the treaty reforms over the political architecture of Europe, will this 
strengthen or weaken this. 
The scholars (Marks, Hooghe, Blank, 1996) identify two ways of governance, the state 
centric governance and the multilevel type of governance. There is a core presumption of the 
state centric concept that European Integration does not challenge the autonomy of member 
states. They sustain that state sovereignty is preserved or even strengthened by the EU 
membership. Their argument is that European integration is based on the bargains between 
the member states governments, and that they do not want to integrate more, because these 
bargains are the lowest denominator of their participation to the Union. This model identifies 
the supranational actors as those actors that are there to aid the member states, by providing 
information, otherwise not so easy o achieve. The policy outcomes reflects the interests and 
the relative power of the member states executives. Supranational actors exercise in this 
situation little independent effect. 
The alternative to this is that the European integration is a polity creating process, in 
which authority and policy-making influence is shared across the multiple levels of 
governments – sub-national, national and supra-national. This view shows that while national 
governments are formidable participants to the EU policy making process, control has slipped 
away from them to the supranational actors. The states have lost some of their authoritative 
control over individuals in their respective territories showing that the locus of political 
control has changed. The individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective 
decision-making, among the national governments and by the autonomous role of the three 
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main institutions that are decision-makers in the EU, the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
The state centric model does not maintain that the policy making is determined at the 
state level, but just the overall direction of the policy-making is at the state control. The state 
can be well served by creating for example a judiciary, in order to enforce collective 
agreements, or a bureaucracy to implement those agreements, even if this institutions are not 
autonomous supranational agents. They have rather limited powers, oriented principally in 
achieving collective goods that are state-oriented.  
The main problem of the state-centric model is the weakness of the decision-making 
process. This is the situation when there is the lowest common denominator among the state 
executive position. The member states executives decide together, but they are not compelled 
to agree policies they find unacceptable, due to the fact that decision making process on 
important issues operates on the base of unanimity, allowing the member states to maintain 
both individual and collective control over outcomes. In fact, this way, while some 
governments are not able to integrate as much as they wish, at the same time they are not 
forced to collaborate deeper than they really want. 
State decision-making is something that in this model does not exist in a political 
vacuum. In this model, state executives are located in domestic political arena, and their 
negotiating positions are influenced by domestic political interests, but this, only in the 
situation that political arenas are discrete. The core of this model is that policy-making in the 
EU is primarily influenced by state executives constrained by political interests, nested within 
autonomous state arenas that connect sub national groups on European affairs. 
 
WHAT DOES MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE BRING NEW? 
 
The multilevel governance model does not reject this view that the state executives and 
state arenas are important and that they remain the most important pieces of the European 
puzzle. This concept shows that the state does not longer monopolizes the domestic interest, 
because a very different polity comes into focus. First, according to this model, decision-
making are shared by different actors at different levels, rather than being monopolized by the 
state executives. The European institutions, the supranational actors have independent 
influence in the policy-making process that cannot be derived from their role as agents of state 
executives. This multilevel-governance theory shows that not only the state should play its 
role on the European arena, but also, the other supranational actors. 
Secondly, collective decision-making among the states involves a significant loss of 
control for the member states executives. The lowest common denominator is set at the level 
of just one type of decisions, those mainly regarding the European integration. Other type of 
decisions, for example those concerning the rules that have to be enforced across the EU have 
a zero sum character, because they involve both gains and losses. 
Thirdly, the political arenas are more interconnected than nested. While national arenas 
remain important for developing the state executive preferences, the multilevel model it 
rejects the fact that the sub-national actors are exclusively nested with them, because they 
operate both on national and also supranational arenas, creating transnational associations. For 
this concept of governance, the states are among the actors contesting decisions made at a 
variety of levels. Complex interrelationships in domestic politics do not stop at the nation-
state level, but extend also to the European level. The demarcation line between this levels 
that is the core of the state-centric model is argued by the multilevel governance model. In 
fact, even if the states are an important part of the EU, they are no longer the single interface 
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between sub-national and supranational arenas, and they share, rather than monopolize the 
control function in their respective territories. 
The European union is described by the notion of “new governance” in the sense of 
“multilevel, non-hierarchical, deliberative and apolitical governance, via a complex of 
public/private networks and quasi-autonomous agencies” (Hix, 1998: 54). The idea of EU as 
multilevel governance system it is based on the existence of overlapping competencies among 
the multiple levels of government, and the interaction of the political actors present at that 
level. The member states, powerful in the state-centric approach, are now just among the 
many actors on the European scene. The EU as multilevel governance manifests a tendency of 
ambiguity as political space, as the EU is a sui-generis political system that makes binding 
decisions in the policy areas in that areas where the powers of the traditional state arrived 
rather late and is much weaker in the area where the state showed its ability to use coercive 
power. 
In fact, the point of view of the EU (represented by the Commission) shows that the 
networks are seen as assets rather than impediments, because they are deliberately created by 
the Commission, in order to implement policy in a more effective way, to increase awareness 
of certain problems at the national level, or to give a “European” dimension to a problem that 
is still in the policy competence of national governments (Sbargia, 2000,). The bare existence 
of the networks is combined with the semi-administrative autonomy of the Commission. 
From one perspective, this can be seen as the nucleus of an emerging regulatory regime, 
where the separation is efficiency oriented. On the other hand, the Commission is already 
embedded in plural networks of interest and intermediation and that is dependent in its action 
on the existence of national administrations (Ludlow, 2001). 
One of the key issues arising in this area is the “Europeanisation” of the public 
administration that means more than homogenization and adjustment. It means the growing of 
a two ways reliance between the national and EU bureaucracies. This process is developed 
trough several channels (Page, 2003). The first of this channels is a coercive mechanism, that 
results from the fact the EU is able to issue orders, and this is the reason for the fact that the 
EU is the source of initiatives that have the force of law and produces homogeneity. The 
second channel is an imitation model that result from the EU policy transfer. Initiatives that 
might be at EU level, individual national practices, syntheses of different national practices 
are imitated by the other member states. This exchange between national authorities it is 
driven those national authorities that share common concerns about solving policy problems 
and also causal understandings and technical expertise. For this reason, we can consider the 
multilevel approach a pro-active one. The third proposed channel is referring to an adjustment 
model, based on the fact that member states react similarly to the conditions created by the 
European Union. The fourth channel is a polydiffusion model, that is executed by a variety of 
actors who transfer ideas and practices in different ways.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Multilevel governance is a modern concept that allows to all stakeholders to express 
their needs and problems at both supranational and sub-national levels, but also to find 
solution for those problems. It is a modern method of governance, where the political 
component is not on the first place, because this is a deliberative way of societal management. 
There is a continuous communication at the level of component networks of the system. This 
type of communication, trough different channels encourages the spreading of “best 
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practices” at the level of regions, allowing them to implement the best ways of solving the 
regions problems. 
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